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Abstract. There is broad agreement that the study of military history is 
an essential component of professional education for military officers. 
Although many successful modern commanders, including Napoleon 
and MacArthur, advocated extending their reading back to ancient 
times, Clausewitz wrote: “The further back one goes, the less useful mil-
itary history becomes.” This essay argues, to the contrary, that officers 
have much to gain by including pre-modern warfare in their studies. A 
larger and more diverse data-set of examples and case studies allows for 
more reliable generalization, gives more opportunities for inspiration, 
and helps guard against the tempting but unwise assumptions that the 
next war will be similar to the last one, and the equally tempting and 
equally unwise presumption that material strength alone will ensure vic-
tory. Moreover, historians of ancient and medieval warfare, like officers 
exercising their core professional responsibility in combat, must grapple 
with scanty and conflicting evidence. Pre-modern history, like war, is a 
realm of uncertainty; many of the “facts” can only be known as proba-
bilities. The best preparation for seeing through the fog of war, therefore, 
may be the exercise of peering through the mists of time. 
The question of why military leaders should study the wars of the ancient 
and medieval periods is a subset of the broader question of why they 
should study military history at all.
To answer that, we might offer the glib response: “because General 
Wolfe, Emperor Napoleon, General Jomini, General Clausewitz, Field 
Marshal von Moltke the Elder, Marshal Foch, General Patton, General 
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MacArthur, and President Eisenhower all say they should.”1 Patton, for 
example – in a letter written on June 6, 1944 – instructed his son, a West 
Point cadet, that “To be a successful soldier, you must know history.”2
But I need to go beyond such general assertions of utility if I want 
to argue for the importance and value of studying a particular sort of 
military history. The question is thus not whether the study of past wars is 
valuable, but rather how and why it is valuable to military professionals. 
Once we have a firm sense of the mechanisms by which this intellectual 
endeavour helps prepare leaders for the conduct of war, we will be in a 
position to examine whether there are ways in which the study of pre-
modern conflicts would especially well support those processes, or con-
versely whether the benefits of historical study might be reduced if that 
study were limited to relatively recent warfare. It should be emphasized 
at the start that the topic at hand is the study of military history – a pro-
cess – not knowledge of military history, which is just one of the valuable 
results of the process.
In order to recapitulate the basic arguments for why and how officers 
should study military history, let me begin with some thoughts on the 
value of studying history in general as part of a well-rounded education, 
for any student preparing to enter any of the Professions with a capital 
P (that is, in Samuel Huntington’s sense of the word).3 Next I will turn 
to the importance of studying military history for military professionals, 
1 Most of these distinguished soldiers will be quoted below. For the views of Moltke, see Hajo 
Holborn, “The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff,” – Makers of 
Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1986), 289–290. Foch, like Moltke a disciple of Clausewitz on this topic, in his Principles of 
War notes that professional military instruction should be based on application of principles to 
historical case-studies, “in order (1) to prepare for experience, (2) to teach the art of command-
ing, (3) lastly, to impart the habit of acting correctly without having to reason [things through].” 
Ferdinand Foch, Principles of War, tr. Hilaire Belloc (New York: Henry Holt, 1920), 11; see also 
ibid, Precepts and Judgments, tr. Hilaire Belloc (London: Chapman and Hall, 1919), 170 (“To 
keep the brain of an army going in time of peace…there is no book more fruitful to the student 
than that of history.”), 184, 222. 
2 George S. Patton Jr., letter to George S. Patton IV, 6 June 1944, in Benjamin Patton with Jen-
nifer Scruby, Growing Up Patton: Reflections on Heroes, History, and Family Wisdom (New York: 
Dutton Caliber, 2012), 50.
3 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U.P., 1957).
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cribbing liberally from Sir B. H. Liddell Hart and Sir Michael Howard. 
Finally, I will address my narrower topic. 
So why should we study history at all?4 First, because the rigorous 
study of history provides the same benefits that can come with any other 
aspect of a high-quality liberal education: exercise in developing valuable 
questions; identifying, finding, collecting, and organizing relevant infor-
mation; assessing the quality of the evidence in light of its sources; ana-
lysing that information to identify patterns and gaps; filling in gaps and 
otherwise solving problems with the available data; refining questions 
and hypotheses in an iterative fashion as the research develops; reaching 
conclusions through rigorous thought, taking full account of arguments 
and facts that line up against your hypothesis as well as those that support 
it; then employing effective writing – with good structure and clear, con-
cise, correct prose – to communicate your analysis and conclusions in a 
persuasive, efficient, and hopefully even elegant way. The study of history, 
moreover, should develop not just the student’s mind, but also the stu-
dent’s character. History is a discipline built on the foundation of empa-
thy: historical thinking requires an effort to see different worlds through 
the eyes of those who lived in them, to consider decisions and actions in 
the context of social constructions of values and mores that are almost 
never identical to our own. And to do the job properly, a historian needs 
to be curious, observant, open-minded, hard-working, humble, and resil-
ient, and willing to learn from mistakes. The value of those characteristics 
for military officers should be obvious.
Second, because the human world of today is an extension of the 
human world of the past, and its current structures, tensions, problems, 
and ruptures cannot really be understood without knowledge and appre-
ciation of their origins and development.
4 Although the following paragraphs are based on my own reflection on a quarter-century of 
teaching military history to West Point cadets, and not at all on Tosh’s book, those looking for 
a thoughtful and concise exploration “historical mindedness” and “applied history” have prac-
tical benefits for the development of citizens (and officials) may see John Tosh, Why History 
Matters, 2nd ed. (London: Red Globe Press, 2019). Tosh, however, falls prey to the same sort of 
emphasis on modern history that can discourage officers looking for “practical” lessons from 
studying medieval or ancient times – even though he himself also recognizes that “paradoxi-
cally the value of the past lies precisely in what is different from our world.” Ibid., ix, 26, 128–29.
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Third, to quote Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart: “There is no excuse for any 
literate person if he is less than three thousand years old in mind.”5 There 
is an old trope that age and experience bring wisdom. That is an oversim-
plification, of course – we have probably all known old men or women 
who were not particularly wise, and as Frederick the Great observed, “A 
mule who had served on ten campaigns under Prince Eugène would not 
become a better tactician through the experience; and it must be admit-
ted, to the shame of humanity, that on this point of lazy stupidity many 
old officers are no better than such a mule.”6 Wisdom does not come sim-
ply from growing old and gaining experience, but rather from reflecting 
on experience with an open mind and a desire to learn. Gaining wisdom 
requires us to use the feedback from expectations that prove either jus-
tified or unjustified to see more deeply into the complexities of human 
interaction (including the interactions between individual humans; inter-
actions of individual people with human constructs like governments, 
businesses, armies, or coalitions; and interactions between one such con-
struct and another). Such reflection can provide a better appreciation 
not just of which factors shape the outcomes of such interactions, but 
also their relative importance and how their weights vary under different 
 specific circumstances.
It is in some ways easiest to gain wisdom from our own personal 
experiences, which we observe most fully and feel most immediately. 
But the benefits of reflection on experience are only to a limited extent 
transferable from one sort of experience to another, and both the brevity 
of human life and the limits of our ability to observe our present world 
restrict our ability to gain wisdom through direct experience. From obser-
vation of our own daily lives, it can be difficult to gain a sense of how 
much of the human interaction we witness on a daily basis is shaped by 
universal (or at least general) patterns and processes, versus ones distinct 
to our own cultures, times, and circumstances. Moreover, the focal length 
5 B. H. Liddell Hart, Why Don’t We Learn from History (London: P.E.N. Books/George Allen 
& Unwin, n.d., first published 1944), 7–8.
6 G. A. Büttner, Mémoires du Baron de la Motte Fouqué… dans lesquels on a inserré sa cor-
respondence intéressante avec Frédéric II, Roi de Prusse, vol. 1 (Berlin: François de LaGarde, 
1788), 45.
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of lived experience is short. Many of us live our entire lives without direct 
observations of the big decisions made by national or world leaders. Even 
those individuals who reach the pinnacles of power and responsibility 
often have only a few years operating at that level in which to gain experi-
ence of it – and meanwhile little time for to spare for reflection. It follows 
that if we want wisdom to help us address or understand big problems 
like whether an international military alliance should be expanded, or 
whether economic sanctions should be threatened or employed against a 
rival power, or whether fighting an actual shooting war may be justified, 
we need to draw on a greater range of experience than our own direct 
observation can provide, or indeed than we can get from the indirect 
observation (through the media) of the events of just our own lifetimes. 
If it is granted that history as we know it was invented by Thucydides, 
then it is fair to say that the discipline of history was created as a tool to 
address just that problem. That is clear enough from Thucydides’s own 
text but is perhaps best expressed by his first English translator, Thomas 
Hobbes, who considered the Athenian the “most Politique Historiogra-
pher that ever writ.” Why? “He fills his narrations with that choice of mat-
ter, and orders them with such judgment, and with such perspicuity and 
efficacy expresses himself, that, as Plutarch says, he makes his hearer a 
spectator. For he sets his reader in the assemblies of the People, and in the 
Senates, at their debating; in the streets, at their sedition; and in the field, 
at their battles. So that look how much a man of understanding might 
have added to his experience, if he had then lived, a beholder of their pro-
ceedings, and familiar with the men and business of the time; so much, 
almost, may he profit now, by attentive reading of the same here written. 
He may from the narrations draw out lessons to himself, and of himself 
be able to trace the drifts and counsels of the actors to their seats.”7
The value of gaining wisdom by studying history, though it applies to 
all citizens, applies a fortiori to leaders, and especially to military leaders. 
Today, unlike in the days of the Roman Republic or the Hundred Years 
War, most years in most countries pass in peace, or at least in states of 
7 Thucydides, Eight Bookes of the Peloponnesian Warre, tr. Thomas Hobbes (London: Richard 
Mynne, 1684), n.p. (second page of “To the Readers”); English modernized.
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conflict short of actual war. If the core of officership is war-fighting, then, 
as Michael Howard and others have rightly emphasized, military officers 
are the only professionals who can be expected to spend years without 
engaging in the core activity of their profession.8 In many armies today, 
even very senior commanders have never seen a full-scale battle – or if 
they have, it was likely from the perspective of a company-grade officer. 
So if wisdom about how to fight a division or a corps, to say nothing of a 
field army or a national or coalition war effort, especially in a general war 
between peer competitors, could only come from life experience, then 
it would of necessity be in very short supply when it next proves most 
needed. It could be gained on the job, but the cost of that is very high. If 
having wisdom means anything, it means making somewhat fewer mis-
takes in complex human interactions than are made by less-wise people, 
and of all human activities, war is the one where a single mistake is most 
likely to cost many lives, and could even affect the destiny of a nation. 
It follows that military leaders have nothing less than a moral obligation 
to seek wisdom through history.9 As Eisenhower wrote to the cadets of 
West Point: “Through a careful and objective study of [past campaigns], 
a professional officer acquires knowledge of military experience which he 
himself could not otherwise accumulate. The facts of a given battle may 
no longer serve any practical purpose... but when the serious student of 
the military art delves into the reasons for the failure of a specific attack… 
he is, by this very activity, preparing for a day in which he, under differ-
ent circumstances, may be facing decisions of vital consequence to his 
country.”10
8 Michael Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,” originally published in 1962, 
repr. in Parameters 11 (1981), 13; B. H. Liddell Hart, Why Don’t We Learn from History, revised 
edition (N.P.: Sophon, 2012), 22–23.
9 Liddell Hart was being a bit too limited (since we can profit from good examples as well 
as bad ones) when he wrote that “History is a catalogue of mistakes. It is our duty to profit by 
them.” Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Through the Fog of War (New York: Random House, 1938), 
153.
10 Dwight D. Eisenhower to the Corps of Cadets, United States Military Academy, 22 April 
1959, in The West Point Atlas of American Wars, ed. Vincent J. Esposito, vol. 1 (New York: 
Praeger, 1959), iii. And similarly Douglas MacArthur, “Annual Report (1935),” – General Mac-
Arthur Speeches and Reports, ed. Edward T. Imparato (Nashville: Turner Publishing, 2000), 
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I already noted, however, that wisdom gained from one sort of expe-
rience transfers only to a limited degree to different sorts of problems or 
endeavours. Indeed, wisdom gained in one field can lead to worse judg-
ment, rather than better judgment, when applied to a very different area. 
Does it not then follow that it makes perfect sense to focus officers’ his-
torical study on the recent past, which is presumably more like the pres-
ent and the near future than the distant past is?
Perhaps so, but not if that focus is so tight that in-depth knowledge 
of the last war or the last few wars is pursued to the exclusion of the 
broader chronological sweep of military history. A general with vicari-
ous experience of high command that stretches back ten, twenty or thirty 
times as long as his personal experience as a flag officer will surely be at 
an advantage over one without that historical insight, but such a still-
limited chronological scope means knowledge of only a limited number 
of wars: a data set with a low N, which makes false generalizations and 
bad analogies dangerously likely. As Michael Howard has noted, it is 
easy to see how wisdom gained by the study of offensive successes of the 
Franco–Prussian and Russo–Japanese wars might have led to wrong 
conclusions and assumptions among military planners before the start 
of the very  different First World War, and then in turn how study of 
the strength of the defence during that war could contribute to a fail-
ure to anticipate the full potential of the German Bewegungskrieg of 
1939–1940.11 “Must we conclude that [the study of] history has misled 
us?” wondered a French staff officer on the day of the German entry 
into Paris in the latter year.12 If it did, though, it must have been a flawed 
study of history, too focused on the recent past and not enough on the 
full chronological sweep of history. A historian who had reflected on 
the campaigns of Alexander the Great should have been aware that a 
focused onslaught by a relatively small force of better-armoured, highly 
mobile troops can break through a seemingly powerful front, causing 
107: “Devoid of opportunity, in peace, for self-instruction through the actual practice of his 
profession, the soldier makes maximum use of the historical record in assuring the readiness of 
himself and his command to function efficiently in emergency.”
11 Howard, “Use and Abuse,” 13.
12 Marc Bloch, Apologie pour l’histoire, ou métier d’historien (Paris: Armand Colin, 1974), 21.
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confusion, then panic, then the  dissolution of the opposing force. Stu-
dents who had examined William the Conqueror’s invasion of England 
in 1066 should have known that contests of grinding attrition are not 
the only way to win wars. Anyone who had examined the expulsion of 
the English from Normandy in 1449–1450 ought to have known that 
even extensive and strong fortifications may not suffice to hold a line if 
there is not a mobile force capable of winning in open combat to back 
up the defences. And thoughtful observers who considered these three 
cases together would have brought home to them that the worst strategic 
defeats generally arose in part from fractures or fissures in the losing side’s 
body politic. 
Moreover, recent history studied in isolation might have been mis-
leading in 1940, but a broader view of the military past makes it clear 
that it is not a fair assumption that the next war will be “like” the last war 
in what turns out to be the ways that matter most, which may well not 
be technology or the structure of military organizations. We don’t have 
to look back to the wars of the French Revolution to realize that. Offi-
cers of 1949 who looked only at the prior half-century of conflicts would 
naturally have been less than ideally prepared for the war of limited ends, 
means, and methods that was about to break out in Korea. American 
officers of 1964 who focused their attention solely on the Korean War 
and World Wars would not have been as wise about the war they were 
about to enter in Vietnam as they could have been had they stretched 
their historical literacy back to the Philippine Insurrection, or the suc-
cessful counter-terrorism campaign of Lewis Merrill in South Carolina 
in 1871–1873, or Winfield Scott’s occupation of Mexico in 1847–1848, 
or Louis Suchet’s counterinsurgency in Aragon in 1809–1810 – or, to my 
point, Edward I’s conquest of Wales in the thirteenth century.13 That, in a 
nutshell, is why Howard insisted on the necessity studying military his-
tory in chronological width and in context, as well as in depth. Those who 
13 Readers for whom the last-mentioned case seems not to fit with the others should see Clif-
ford J. Rogers, “Giraldus Cambrensis, Edward I, and the Conquest of Wales,” – Successful Strate-
gies. Triumphing in War and Peace from Antiquity to the Present, ed. Williamson Murray and 
Richard Hart Sinnreich (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 2014), 65–99.
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fail to follow that advice may find Clio a deceptive Muse, rather than a 
source of enlightenment and inspiration.14
If you will grant me (and Sir Michael) that point, that still leaves open 
the question of why it would be valuable to study ancient and medieval 
warfare, rather than broadening one’s vicarious experience to include, 
say, the most recent past two centuries. Clausewitz, for one, though he 
had for his day a good knowledge of earlier warfare, wrote that it was only 
starting with the time Frederick the Great that wars were “close enough 
to modern warfare to be instructive.” “The further back one goes,” he 
continued, “the less useful military history becomes, growing poorer and 
barer at the same time. The history of antiquity is without doubt the most 
useless and barest of all.”15 This conclusion rested on two pillars. First, 
before Frederick’s time cavalry was more important than infantry and the 
use of firearms was much less advanced. Since the relationship among the 
means of combat was so different, tactics were very different, and since 
tactics are the means of strategy, war as a whole was very different. Hence, 
any lessons drawn from the history of earlier eras would be of limited 
validity. Second, it is unwise to try to draw lessons from any examples 
that one cannot understand properly in the first place. Due to lack of 
sources comparable to those available for more recent times, Clausewitz 
argued, we cannot have for pre-modern examples the “precise knowledge 
of actual circumstances” that is needed for the proper use of military his-
tory as a tool for the development of military judgment.16
I don’t like to disagree with Clausewitz, since those who do so usu-
ally prove to be wrong. But then, Clausewitz didn’t like to disagree with 
Napoleon, whom he called the God of War, and Napoleon advised stu-
dents of war to “read and read again the campaigns of Alexander, Hanni-
14 As John Tosh, author of Why History Matters, noted: “There is a great deal of analogical 
reasoning that is complete garbage. The point about analogy is that it’s really completely coun-
terproductive to focus on a single historical precedent....the more analogies one is aware of, the 
more one’s understanding of what is going on in the moment is open to different readings and 
different understandings.” Donald A. Yerxa, “Why History Matters: An Interview with John 
Tosh,” Historically Speaking 10 (2009): 26; see also Tosh, Why History Matters, 56–70.
15 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and tr. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: 
Princeton U.P., 1984), 173–74.
16 Clausewitz, On War, 173.
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bal, [and] Caesar,” as well as more modern generals, later adding as part 
of his deathbed advice to his son that “this is the only way to become a 
great commander and to discover the secrets of the art of war.”17 MacAr-
thur, too, despite the much greater technological gap between his day 
and Alexander’s than between Napoleon’s and Alexander’s, advocated the 
study of “the dust-buried accounts of wars long past as well as [of] those 
still reeking with the scent of battle,” and condemned as “callow critics” 
those “who hold that only in the most recent battles are there to be found 
truths applicable to our present problems.”18 When he harangued the rep-
resentatives of the Joint Chiefs for hours in order to persuade them of 
the wisdom of his plan for Operation Chromite (the Inchon landing), he 
bolstered his case with a slew of historical examples, the most memorable 
among them (at least for one officer who was present) being the case of 
Alexander’s great battle at Gaugamela.19
In fact, despite his own specific conclusion on this point, Clausewitz 
offers more general observations that suggest why Napoleon recom-
mended that officers study ancient as well as modern campaigns.20 
Clausewitz argued a senior commander’s knowledge of war, which had 
to lead to capability to act rather than an abstract form of understanding, 
could be extracted “from the phenomena of life, as a bee sucks honey 
from a flower,” “through the medium of reflection, study and thought,” 
17 “Lisez, relisez les campagnes d’Alexandre, Annibal, César, Gustave, Turenne, Eugène, 
et de Frédéric; modelez-vous sur eux: voilà le seul moyen de devenir grand capitaine, et de 
surprendre les secrets de l’art de la guerre.” Maximes de Guerre de Napoléon (Paris: Anselin, 
1830), maxim LXXVIII (p. 46). Luvaas, Napoleon on the Art of War, 41. Also Correspondance 
de Napoléon 1er, vol. 31 (Paris: Henri Plon and J. Dumaine, 1870), 365: “la connaissance des 
hautes parties de la guerre ne s’acquiert que par l’étude de l’histoire des guerres et des batailles 
des grands capitaines et par l’expérience.”
18 General MacArthur Speeches and Reports, 108.
19 Interview with LTG Edward Rowny, West Point Center for Oral History, available online at 
http://www.westpointcoh.org/interviews/a-veteran-of-three-hot-wars-and-a-cold-one, at 1:00 
to 1:02. LTG Rowny refers to the battle by its other name, Arbela.
20 Clausewitz, it should be remembered, was a dedicated educator as well as a practical soldier 
and a profound theorist, and he employed his penetrating intellect to think deeply about the 
intersection of his three professions. As Jon Sumida notes, his “special synthesis of history and 
theory constituted a system...of learning.” Jon Tetsuro Sumida, “The Relationship of History 
and Theory in On War: The Clausewitzian Ideal and Its Implications,” Journal of Military His-
tory, 65 (2001): 333–354, at 334.
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as well as through personal experience. The purpose was not to know “all 
the details”; anyone who thought otherwise was a “ridiculous pedant.” 
On the contrary, “great things alone can make a great mind.”21 When we 
combine those ideas with Clausewitz’s observation that “the further one 
progresses from broad generalities to details, the less one is able to select 
examples and experiences from remote times,” as “we are in no position 
to evaluate the relevant events correctly, nor to apply them to the whole 
different means we use today,” there is a logical conclusion to be drawn 
about the inverse: that as one moves from the details to the “great things” 
that can make “great minds,” the difficulties that accompany the study of 
the distant past become less and less important, and the study becomes 
more and more valuable.22 Indeed, the signal-to-noise ratio increases 
dramatically. The lack of cluttering detail leaves the main lines of the 
story clearer and facilitates the inductive learning that creates the kind of 
understanding that becomes instinctive judgment and fuels the capacity 
to act. Clausewitz himself wrote that “the noblest and most solid nourish-
ment that the mind of a general may draw from a study of the past” is an 
appreciation of “the importance of moral [that is, non-material] factors 
and their often incredible effect.”23 I don’t know of any modern memoir 
that serves up that “noble nourishment” better than Julius Caesar’s War 
Commentaries, and it is hard to think of a campaign that better exempli-
fies the power of intangibles to overcome material disadvantages than the 
one that culminated with Henry V’s victory against the “fearful odds” of 
five to one at Agincourt in 1415.24 
In the quotations above, Napoleon was directing his advice to study 
history towards those who aspire to be “great commanders.” But the ben-
efits of sound military judgment derived from the study of history (espe-
cially a better understanding of the so-called “moral forces,” including 
21 Clausewitz, On War, 146, 145.
22 Clausewitz, On War, 174.
23 Clausewitz, On War, 185.
24 Anne Curry has recently argued for a much smaller numerical disproportion at Agincourt, 
but I do not concur with her analysis. See Clifford J. Rogers, “The Battle of Agincourt,” – The 
Hundred Years War (Part II): Different Vistas, ed. L. J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay 
(Leiden: Brill, 2008), 37–132, at 114–121.
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how leaders and soldiers are affected by the strains and circumstances 
that are inherent to the action of war in any age, yet also absent from 
peacetime experience in any age) are as great for junior officers as they are 
for generals. It takes a very large data set of examples and vicarious expe-
riences drawn from widely differing times and places to know what ele-
ments of human-nature-in-war are universal and not contingent on par-
ticular cultural, technological, or societal contexts. The study of ancient 
and medieval military history helps provide the breadth of empirical data 
needed to assess those sorts of questions.
Moreover, although more recent generals and theorists have tended 
to emphasize the value of historical precedent as a source from which 
to derive principles of war, pre-Napoleonic writers put more emphasis 
on history as (in Frederick the Great’s words) a “storehouse of military 
ideas.” General James Wolfe, for example, modelled the training of his 
light infantry at Louisbourg in 1758 on the methods used by Persian 
troops against Xenophon; he commented that his fellow-officers were 
“astonished” by their effectiveness “because they have read nothing.”25 
With this in mind, it should come as no surprise that when he compiled 
a reading list for a prospective officer, Wolfe included Xenophon, along 
with Thucydides, Vegetius, Caesar, and Polybius, and noted that “there 
is an abundance of military knowledge to be picked out of ” the lives of 
the medieval commanders Jan Zizka and Skanderbeg, among others.26 
Although, as we have seen, Clausewitz questioned the usefulness of 
ancient or medieval military history as a basis from which to derive gen-
eralizations or principles, he himself noted that there are other valuable 
ways to use historical examples. He points out that “a historical example 
may simply be used as an explanation of an idea”; this, he says, “gener-
ally calls only for a brief mention of the case, or only one aspect of it 
matters,” and the purpose is “to throw the necessary light on [the] idea 
and to ensure that the reader and the writer will remain in touch.”27 But 
this method only works if the author and the reader – or commander 
25 Beckles Willson, Life and Letters of James Wolfe (London: William Heinemann, 1909), 380.
26 Ibid., 296. 
27 Clausewitz, On War, 170.
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and subordinate – share a common understanding of the example, and if 
both can anticipate that that will be the case. Because military history is 
so expansive, if all students wended their way through it following wher-
ever their interests might take them, an author could not presume his 
readers would know any particular case. But since the key figures and 
events of classical military history – principally the events of the Per-
sian War, the strategic development of the Peloponnesian War, the con-
quests of Alexander, the march up country of Xenophon, the tactical 
genius of Hannibal and the effective counter-measures of Fabius, and 
the generalship of Julius Caesar – are limited in scope and are part of 
the common cultural heritage of all Western and Mediterranean nations, 
they have for this purpose the advantage over the far more voluminous 
and far more compartmentalized national histories of modern (or even 
medieval) times. Or at least they used to, and still should, and will con-
tinue to so long as we do not lose sight of the practical value of studying 
ancient warfare.
Clausewitz also notes that one can “appeal to a historical fact to sup-
port a statement. This will suffice whenever one merely wants to prove the 
possibility of some phenomenon or effect.”28 Anecdotal examples, whether 
from the recent or distant past, can inspire consideration of a wider range 
of alternative courses of action when faced with an unusual problem, and 
that is surely a good thing. Here again the distance and difference of medi-
eval and ancient military history offers a positive value to the student: 
what might otherwise seem impossible because it never occurs in recent 
history may be shown to be possible – and therefore an opportunity that 
might be worth pursuing, or a risk that might need accounting for – by 
looking at the pre-modern repository of experience. Clausewitz makes a 
related point regarding Napoleon’s decision to abandon the siege of Man-
tua to seek battle against Wurmser in 1796: “resisting a relieving army 
behind lines of circumvallation had fallen into such disrepute and con-
tempt that it occurred to no one. And yet in the days of Louis XIV [or, we 
might add, Julius Caesar or Edward III] it had so often been successfully 
employed that one can only call it a whim of fashion that [in 1796] it 
28 Clausewitz, On War, 170.
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never occurred to anyone at least to weigh its merits.” Clausewitz goes on 
to say that “one only has to shed the tyranny of fashion” in order to rec-
ognize that as a possible course of action.29 What he does not add is that 
it was his own knowledge of the military history of earlier eras that gave 
him the ability to recognize that the fashion of his own day was neither 
timeless, nor even normal.30
Another way in which the distance and difference of medieval war-
fare makes its study beneficial is that it offers many examples of asym-
metrical warfare; of wars involving sub-state or non-state actors; and of 
non-binary, non-zero-sum warfare that was resolved by effective political 
compromises. It used to be thought that medieval warfare was practically 
devoid of strategy or of strategic lessons, but that very belief was strong 
evidence of the value of studying medieval warfare, since it arose from 
an inability to conceive of strategy in non-Jominian terms.31 In fact, since 
strategy is essentially the harnessing of military action to political pur-
pose, it should not be surprising that the Middle Ages, when wars were 
almost always directed at the political level by the same men who led 
armies into the field and even fought themselves in battle, strategy was 
in fact quite sophisticated and varied, and can thus be very valuable to 
study. That is all the more true because in recent years Western military 
and political leaders have had difficulty understanding or coming to grips 
with the ways violence and politics interact in areas where the Western-
style state is weak or absent, for example in Afghanistan, Waziristan, or 
Somalia. In the modern period, states have generally raised large revenues 
through taxes, loans, and expedients in order to fund military operations, 
but during the Early and High Middle Ages, war-leaders often had to 
find ways to make war pay for war, through plunder, the distribution of 
conquered land to supporters, or the exaction of protection money from 
29 Ibid.
30 Considering how long ago he wrote, Clausewitz possessed a surprisingly good understand-
ing of how war changed from ancient Greece through the Middle Ages and how those changes 
related to “the nature of states and society as they are determined by their times and prevailing 
conditions.” See On War, 586–93.
31 See Clifford J. Rogers, “Henry V’s Military Strategy in 1415,” – The Hundred Years War: A 
Wider Focus, ed. L. J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 404–415.
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productive citizens under threat of violence.32 Of course, those methods 
are not of much use for modern Western militaries: but modern variants 
of them are used by warlords in failed-state areas today. Understanding 
how Robert Guiscard (“the Wily”) terrorized the inhabitants of southern 
Italy and Sicily into submitting to his rule could be useful to understand-
ing the strategies employed by strongmen in conflict-prone areas today, 
and therefore be useful in figuring out how to defeat them. More broadly, 
medieval wars were fought in a social-cultural-political context in which 
kin-networks were powerful factors, religion was profoundly important, 
and both leaders and soldiers actively sought out opportunities to fight 
in order to gain the martial honour that was perhaps the most valuable 
coin of social status. Medieval wars were usually very far from the pattern 
seen in many modern wars, in which the objective of at least one side is 
the complete defeat and surrender of the enemy, in which a negotiated 
compromise settlement, if it is the result, emerges only when it becomes 
clear that complete victory is out of reach. Medieval wars were com-
monly fought among members of an extended family over the division 
of an inheritance, or to adjust the terms of power-sharing arrangements 
between two partners in rule, or both. They could last for decades or even 
generations, fuelled by cycles of vengeance, deep-seated ethnic antipa-
thies, and shifting allegiances among subordinate actors who did not 
want to see any individual become too strong. Officers who have stud-
ied only conflicts between modern nation-states are missing out on an 
opportunity to gain a class of vicarious experience that could help them 
understand the very different sorts of warfare and armed conflict that 
continue to plague the worst trouble-spots of the modern globe. 
In Afghanistan, for example, first the Soviets and then the Ameri-
cans faced the problem that an invader “can never hope to conquer in 
one single battle a people that will never draw up its forces to engage an 
enemy army in the field, and will never allow itself to be besieged inside 
fortified strong points.” The native fighters “do not lose heart when things 
go wrong, and after one defeat they are always ready to fight again.” “They 
32 The implications of this point are developed in Clifford J. Rogers, “Medieval Strategy and 
the Economics of Conquest,” The Journal of Military History 82 (2018): 709–738.
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are not troubled by hunger or cold, [and] fighting does not seem to tire 
them.” “The entire nation, both leaders and the common people, are 
trained in the use of arms.” When fighting they are accustomed to endur-
ing privation, are skilled in ambushes and hit-and-run tactics, and are at 
home in the roughest, most mountainous terrain, where heavy armoured 
forces cannot operate effectively, and they often fight in ways that their 
enemies consider violations of the laws of war. “Passionately devoted to 
their freedom and the defence of their country,” they “willingly sacrifice, 
suffer, or die” to throw out foreign invaders, and because it is their home-
land, they have the advantage in determination and focus compared to 
foreign powers, even superpowers, which cannot concentrate all their 
strength or attention on any one international problem. Of course, nei-
ther the Soviets nor the Americans were the first to encounter these diffi-
culties, either in Afghanistan or elsewhere. Had they been truly “prudent 
and provident,” they would have studied earlier examples of similar wars 
in the past, to “find out what pitfalls are to be avoided, by taking note 
of the disasters which have befallen others in the same position,” as “it 
costs nothing to learn from other people’s experience.” That, at least, is 
the advice of the twelfth-century bishop Giraldus Cambrensis, who in 
1194 devised an extremely sophisticated (and ultimately successful) plan 
to conquer and control the Welsh, the people about whom all the quota-
tions in this paragraph were written.33
Let me close with what I think is my strongest argument for the util-
ity of studying pre-modern military history for modern officers – which 
actually is a benefit that comes from studying any pre-modern history, 
military or not. In the end, the purpose of studying history is to help 
officers make better decisions: not just in planning or staff work, but 
also, probably most importantly, in combat. I have already argued for the 
value of vicarious experience, and particularly of vicarious experience 
that extends to before the modern era, for that purpose. But as everyone 
knows, it is easier to recognize that it is a good idea to decide to attack the 
enemy on an open flank than it is to have the moral fortitude to make the 
attack proceed through friction. Even the latter may be easier than seeing 
33 Rogers, “Giraldus,” 70–71.
25The Study of Ancient and Medieval Military History
through the fog of war in the first place, to recognize that the enemy has 
an open flank, and to figure out where it is. As Clausewitz emphasizes, 
one of the things that causes both commanders and armies to fall short 
of their goals, or even to freeze up in paralysis, is lack of knowledge about 
the enemy’s situation, and knowing, to paraphrase Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld, that in addition to the known unknowns, unknown unknowns 
pose a constant threat.34 “War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters 
of the factors on which action in was is based are wrapped in a fog of 
greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating judgment is 
called for; a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth.”35 It follows that 
a key part of a military education should be developing the intellectual 
skills to make judgments about the truth when key facts are not known, 
but must be guessed at or estimated on the basis of intelligence received, 
when “many…reports…are contradictory, even more are false, and most 
are uncertain.”36 The study of ancient and medieval warfare can be an 
ideal exercise for developing such judgment, since in order to reach con-
clusion about why events turned out as they did, the historian must begin 
by establishing the basic facts – what happened – based on assessment of 
the quality of various conflicting and mostly unreliable written accounts, 
some given by eyewitnesses, more at second or third hand.37 In the study of 
modern history, the main facts are usually agreed upon, though interpre-
tations of them vary. That is not the case for ancient or medieval history. 
Establishing cause-effect relationships or even generally understanding 
34 Clausewitz, On War, 140, 101.
35 Ibid., 101.
36 Ibid., 117.
37 For any given battle of the American Civil War or World War Two, there are likely to be 
thousands of pages of official reports, memoirs, private letters, and other primary sources, 
making it impractical for the student to grapple with them all. For an ancient battle, there 
may be just one or two. A number of medieval battles (for example, Hastings, Crécy, Poitiers, 
or Agincourt) have a golden mean: a large enough number of sources of sufficiently variable 
detail and quality to make for a good exercise, but a small enough total that it is possible for 
students to work through them all and, in that respect, to be able to stand on even footing with 
the historians who themselves debate the facts of the event and also their causal relationships. 
Students generally will not be able to reach conclusions as solid as the ones they might (given 
sufficient time) be able to reach regarding a modern engagement, but the point here is about 
the value of the process, not of the output. 
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a past event is complicated by having to treat each “fact” as a mere pos-
sibility, where the facts shape the pattern, but the emerging pattern can 
then help judge among sources and therefore determine the facts. Grap-
pling with those problems is an experience that should ideally be part of 
the wisdom-building of every well-educated officer. To study the battle 
and campaign of Hastings, moreover, is not just a matter of examining 
how William the Conqueror overcame problems of incomplete informa-
tion, politics and strategy, morale, logistics, and terrain to achieve deci-
sive victory in 1066. It is also an opportunity to learn from the ways in 
which past historians have tackled the challenges of judging between or 
reconciling seemingly contradictory assertions by medieval authors, and 
the methods they have used to determine the most probable answers to 
important questions that no witnesses spoke to directly. Historians can-
not observe the human past directly, yet the human past is their topic, so 
they collectively have spent 2,500 years developing and refining methods 
to overcome that fundamental difficulty. One of the greatest problems 
facing military commanders in wartime is that they have to make deci-
sions based on factors that they cannot observe directly (regarding their 
own forces) and that may be very obscure indeed (regarding the enemy). 
By the careful study of pre-modern military history, today’s officers can 
not only learn from the leaders of the past the art of command, but also 
learn from the scholars of the past (and present) the art of rigorously ana-
lysing difficult and indirect sources of information. The best preparation 
for seeing through the fog of war may be the exercise of peering through 
the mists of time.
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